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review of administrative evidence overlooks science’s 
linguistic tradition 
By Jimmy J. Zhuang, Ph.D.*  
The administrative law literature has frequently questioned the 
wisdom and efficacy of generalist courts reviewing specialist agency 
decisionmakers.  This concern has been ballooning as more and more 
agencies regulate activities at the frontiers of science.  The courts have 
generally followed the substantial evidence standard enunciated in the 
Benzene case when reviewing scientific matters within the administrative 
record.  In this Essay, I argue that the Benzene court inappropriately 
emphasizes the language of the scientific evidence when determining 
whether the agency has met the requisite certainty.  Post-Benzene courts 
mandate not only a high degree of scientific certainty for decisions, but 
also require a high-confidence linguistic style for composing the 
supporting evidence.  This latter requirement contradicts the writing style 
of the scientific community.  Scientific literature uses a restrained and 
tentative linguistic style that the Benzene Court is unaware of, but is deeply 
suspicious of.  Therefore, this Essay argues that close-reading of scientific 
literature’s language is an incorrect tool for determining scientific 
evidence’s certainty because it overlooks science’s linguistic tradition. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in an administrative state.  The technical complexities of 
modern governance require expertise that broad stroke legislatures do not 
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possess.1  The constitutional safeguard against this ever-growing fourth 
branch is supposedly the expansive and presumptive availability of 
judicial review.2  However, the administrative law literature has frequently 
questioned the wisdom and efficacy of generalist courts reviewing 
specialist agency decisionmakers.3  This concern has been ballooning as 
more and more agencies regulate activities at the frontiers of science.4  The 
courts have thus sought a unifying standard for reviewing scientific 
matters within the administrative record. The seminal case of Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, known as the Benzene 
case,5 established the canonical framework for the substantial evidence 
standard in reviewing decisions that rely on scientific evidence. 
In this Essay, I outline the Benzene framework and focus on the 
Court’s discussion of the scientific certainty that it requires.  Using a 
particularly troubling style of textualism, the Benzene Court seems to 
                                                                                                                                     
* J.D., 2016, Yale Law School. Ph.D. biochemistry, 2013, Harvard University. A.B. 
molecular biology & applied mathematics, 2008, Dartmouth College. I would like to thank 
Professor Jerry Mashaw for discussion and suggestions for this Essay. 
 1 See generally Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989) (arguing that today’s legislatures are limited to duties of 
delegation and funding, with all other lawmaking handled by administrative agencies). 
 2 Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
55, 93 n. 207 (1965) (“the availability of judicial review is by far the most significant 
safeguard against administrative excess . . . . [An] important source of the efficacy of 
judicial review is its preventive value.”); see also Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: 
Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1992) (discussing the presumptive availability of judicial 
review after Overton Park); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: “Substantial Evidence on the 
Whole Record”, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (1951) (discussing the broad scope of 
judicial review for substantial evidence after Universal Camera). 
 3 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. 
REG. 283, 309–10 (1986) (“Technical expertise . . . may greatly aid the interpretation of 
regulatory statutes, especially where an understanding of congressional intent requires 
familiarity with technical issues . . . . Although technical statutes are, of course, produced 
by generalist legislators[,] . . . the agency inevitably enjoys an edge in understanding 
technical concepts and terminology contained in the statute or its legislative history. The 
agency is also more familiar with the regulated industry. These advantages . . . are all the 
more evident during an era of burgeoning judicial caseloads . . . .”); Peter L. Strauss, One 
Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited 
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1127 (1987) 
(“[In] an area generally characterized by statutes of substantially greater complexity and 
technical detail than those of an earlier generation[,] . . . a judge’s limited resources, his 
only occasional opportunities to seek understanding, and the often distorting character of 
the litigation perspective . . . can lead him to fear that his decision will be more disruptive 
than helpful to the statutory scheme.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (“[S]ome of the questions . . . are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and 
consequently . . . [d]ecision making must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent 
upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual analysis.”). 
 5 448 U.S. 607 (1980) [hereinafter Benzene]. 
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emphasize the language of the scientific evidence within the 
administrative record when determining whether the agency has met the 
requisite certainty.  Therefore, the Benzene Court not only mandates a high 
degree of scientific certainty for decisions, but also requires a high-
confidence linguistic style for composing the supporting evidence.  This 
latter requirement is in direct contradiction with the writing style of the 
scientific community. 
To show this important oversight, I excerpt capstone conclusions 
from papers that won the Nobel Prize in chemistry during the four years 
after the Benzene case as well as the most recent four years.  They show 
that scientific literature uses a restrained and tentative linguistic style that 
the Benzene Court is unaware of. One historic reason for this subdued 
linguistic style is that science is thought to be continuously progressing.  
While today’s scientific writing still follows this tradition, the language 
does not actually reflect a lack of certainty; in fact, scientists have readily-
available and extremely powerful statistical tools to precisely determine 
certainty.  Thus, although the theoretical reasoning for the Benzene Court’s 
certainty requirement seems correct – legal determinations and their errors 
carry great risk, which means they mandate greater certainty – close-
reading scientific literature remains an inappropriate tool for meeting this 
stringency because it overlooks science’s linguistic tradition. 
II. THE BENZENE FRAMEWORK 
In reviewing agency determinations based on scientific evidence, the 
Benzene court laid down the now canonical precept that 
[although an agency] is not required to support its finding . . . with 
anything approaching scientific certainty[,] . . . the Agency’s findings must 
be supported by substantial evidence . . . . [W]here its findings must be 
made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge . . . , so long as they are 
supported by a body of reputable scientific thought, the Agency is free to 
use conservative assumptions in interpreting the data.6 
To operationalize this standard, the Court specifically explains that 
the substantial evidence must demonstrate “at least more likely than not” 
that the agency’s position is correct.7  On its face, this more-than-likely 
standard for evaluating scientific evidence seems perfectly reasonable, as 
it approximates the civil standard of preponderance of evidence.  
Moreover, in the Benzene case itself, this standard seems to have been 
correctly applied: OSHA failed to provide evidence that there was any 
                                                                                                                                     
 6 Id. at 656. 
 7 Id. at 653 (emphasis added). 
2016] Judicial Review Overlooks Science's Linguistic Tradition 217 
significant workplace risk for benzene exposure.8  Thus, to rule on the 
case, the Court did not need to reach the question of what specific benzene 
exposure levels are acceptable.  However, the Court goes on to evaluate 
OSHA’s evidence anyways, in order to provide guidance on what is 
considered sufficient substantial evidence.  Before discussing these 
guidelines, it is worth noting that the Court emphasizes throughout the 
opinion that it does not require absolute scientific certainty to meet the 
substantial evidence standard.9 
The positive guidance the Benzene Court provides for what meets the 
substantial evidence standard is highly textualist.  In its conclusion, the 
Court states that “[t]he closest [OSHA] came to making a finding that 
benzene presented a significant risk of harm in the workplace was its 
statement that the benefits to be derived . . . were ‘likely’ to be 
‘appreciable.’”10  In the Court’s opinion, the evidence written as able to 
“likely” provide “appreciable” support is insufficient for the more-than-
likely standard.  The quotation marks surrounding “likely” and 
“appreciable” indicate that the Court is attentive to the specific language 
used in the scientific evidence within the administrative record.  The 
implication is that this evidence is insufficient because it was written 
tentatively, using qualifiers such as “likely.”  Thus, the Court is assuming 
that the scientists composing this evidence contemplated the plain-
meaning scienter of every word like a lawyerly scrivener would.  A 
subdued writing style, in the eyes of the Court, reflected a lower certainty 
of the underlying evidence. 
While this linguistic focus may have been unintentional, many courts 
since Benzene have adopted this approach in analyzing the language of the 
evidence within the administrative record.  For example, in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, the Court becomes satisfied with the presented evidence when the 
expert uses the phrase “strong consensus” to describe the views of climate 
scientists during his testimony.11  In another example, a California appeals 
court refused to accept evidence of benzene’s harms because experts could 
only describe its causal link to leukemia as “probable.”12  These and many 
other courts since Benzene have focally evaluated the language of the 
scientific evidence within the administrative record, with special attention 
to qualifiers, as a means to gauge the evidence’s certainty.  This is very 
troubling because scientists write tentatively by tradition. 
                                                                                                                                     
 8 Id. at 614–15. 
 9 See, e.g., id. at 656 (“OSHA is not required to support its finding that a significant 
risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty.”). 
 10 Id. at 653 (emphasis added). 
 11 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007). 
 12 Santiago v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1328 (1990). 
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III. THE CHEMISTRY BETWEEN SCIENTISTS AND COURTS 
Winning the Nobel Prize is the ultimate recognition of scientific 
merit.  To demonstrate the tentative nature of scientific writing, I have 
excerpted scientific papers that won the Nobel Prize in chemistry for the 
four years after Benzene was decided and for the four most recent years.  
It is evident that even these authoritatively rigorous findings are written in 
a restrained and understated style. 
Professor Frederick Sanger won the 1980 chemistry Nobel Prize,13 
months after the Benzene case was decided. He described his key 
experiment as follows: “The sequences can be read with reasonable 
accuracy starting at 88 nucleotides . . . for about 80 nucleotides . . . . For 
the next 50 nucleotides there is some uncertainty in the number of 
nucleotides in ‘runs’ because bands are not actually resolved.”14 
Professor Roald Hoffman won the 1981 chemistry Nobel Prize.15  He 
concluded his seminal paper by stating:  “It is now clear that in the course 
of a chemical reaction the nuclei of the reaction components may undergo 
some extremely complicated motions in order to provide low-energy 
electronic paths.”16 
Professor Aaron Klug won the 1982 chemistry Nobel Prize.17  He 
summarized his groundbreaking research as: “For units that can be 
assembled into an icosahedral shell, these ‘bonds’ must be arranged 
at . . . fixed angles . . . . The building unit is, therefore, likely to be a 
hexamer, which tends to aggregate in plane sheets, but this hexamer could 
also be bonded . . . at a vertex or edge of the icosahedron.”18 
Professor Henry Taube won the 1983 chemistry Nobel Prize.19  He 
summarized his key findings as follows: “If the data on affinities indicate 
anything about the type of binding, they suggest that it is remarkably 
similar for the four cations considered, aluminum ion perhaps being the 
most ‘ionic’.”20 
                                                                                                                                     
 13 All Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates (last accessed Jan. 7, 2016). 
 14 Frederick Sanger, S. Nicklen & Alan R. Coulson, DNA sequencing with Chain-
Terminating Inhibitors, 74 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 5463, 5466 (1977) (emphasis 
added). 
 15 See supra note 14. 
 16 Roald Hoffman & Robert Burns Woodward, Orbital Symmetry Control of Chemical 
Reactions, 167 SCIENCE 825, 825 (1970) (emphasis added). 
 17 See supra note 14. 
 18 Donald L. D. Caspar & Aaron Klug, Physical Principles in the Construction of 
Regular Viruses, 27 COLD SPRING HARBOR SYMP. QUANT. BIOL. 1, 19 (1962) (emphasis 
added). 
 19 See supra note 14. 
 20 Henry Taube, Rates and Mechanisms of Substitution in Inorganic Complexes in 
Solution, 50 CHEM. REV. 69, 88 (1952) (emphasis added). 
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This style of scientific writing is as prevalent today as it was in the 
1980s.  Professor Robert Lefkowitz won the 2012 chemistry Nobel Prize.21  
He crystallized his core findings by stating: “Our data suggest that P-
arrestin is required to effect inhibition of receptor function subsequent to 
phosphorylation by βARK.”22 
Professor Arieh Warshel won the 2013 chemistry Nobel Prize.23  He 
concluded his seminal paper as follows: “[I]t seems that a promising way 
to simulate the surface crossing in rhodopsin might be achieved by a 
chemical approach of building a model compound with a Schiff base 
bridge between the ring to the end of the chain.”24 
Professor Eric Betzig won the 2014 chemistry Nobel Prize.25  He 
concluded his seminal paper by remarking that “the good fit of the data to 
the model for each molecule . . . suggests that the apparent absorption 
cross section and quantum yield are quite uniform . . . . Finally, . . . it is 
possible to use these same methods . . . to determine the emission dipole 
orientations as well as the absorption dipole directions shown here.”26 
And most recently, Professor Paul Modrich won the 2015 chemistry 
Nobel Prize.27  He concluded his seminal paper by stating: “[T]hese 
findings suggest that mutS-DNA interaction involves an asymmetry 
inherent to the four mispairs tested or, alternatively, an asymmetry 
imposed by this set of mispairs on the DNA helix.”28 
All of these excerpts reflect a common theme in scientific writing: 
they are littered with qualifiers.  The sentence structure “[our data] or [this] 
may suggest perhaps [that]” is probably the most commonly-used phrase 
in all of science. A Google Scholar search for the three-word string “may 
suggest perhaps” will confirm this. In fact, one of the greatest scientific 
discoveries ever was written as such an understatement: “[What] we have 
postulated . . . suggests a possible copying mechanism for . . . genetic 
                                                                                                                                     
 21 See supra note 14. 
 22 Martin J. Lohse, Jeffrey L. Benovic, Juan Codina, Marc G. Caron & Robert J. 
Lefkowitz, β-Arrestin: a Protein That Regulates β-Adrenergic Receptor Function, 248 
SCIENCE 1547, 1549 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 23 See supra note 14. 
 24 Arieh Warshel, Bicycle-pedal Model for the First Step in the Vision Process, 260 
NATURE 679, 683 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 25 See supra note 14. 
 26 Eric Betzig & Robert J. Chichester, Single Molecules Observed by Near-Field 
Scanning Optical Microscopy, 262 SCIENCE 1422, 1424 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 27 See supra note 14. 
 28 Shin-San & Paul Modrich, Escherichia coli mutS-Encoded Protein Binds to 
Mismatched DNA Base Pairs, 83 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA, 5057, 5060–61 (1986) 
(emphasis added). 
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material.”29  Therefore, the predominant writing style in science is to be 
tentative. 
Science likely first developed this understated linguistic style 
because it is an endlessly progressive endeavor.  There is always the 
possibility that new discoveries trump old facts.  From this ancient 
mindset, scientists have passed on this written tradition of humility.  
However, over the years, this writing style has become more and more a 
pro forma tradition, and less and less a reflection of any actual scienter of 
hesitation about the reported findings.  With the development of strong 
statistical tools, scientists can now describe exactly how certain they are.  
Today, in any reputable scientific paper, universal publication standards 
require a p value of less than 0.05 before a scientific finding can be 
reported; roughly, this means almost all published scientific findings are 
20 times more likely to be true than not.30  This is far greater precision and 
certainty than Benzene’s “at least more likely than not” standard.  And yet, 
despite such statistical certainties, all published scientist writings still add 
on phrases such as “our findings may suggest perhaps that” to describe 
their results, in order to pay homage to the traditional scientific writing 
style.  Therefore, within a modern scientific paper, authors often present 
precise statistical certainties in the raw data figures,31 but still heed the 
revered tradition of writing with qualifiers in the paper’s text.32  In other 
words, scientific writing reads like it is hesitant about its conclusions when 
in fact it is not.  It is indeed a misleading linguistic tradition that scientists 
use powerful statistical tools and present precise certainty measurements 
within their papers and yet still use a qualifier-rich writing style.  This 
means that when construing scientific writing, words like “suggest” or 
“perhaps” should effectively be treated as terms-of-art, rather than their 
plain-meanings of an implied scienter. 
Jurists and lawyers will likely struggle to accept such a linguistic 
tradition for two reasons.  First, lawyers write to advocate; inherent to 
zealous advocacy is an assurance of a one-sided presentation.  From this 
perspective, it is difficult to fathom how a seemingly hedged statement can 
                                                                                                                                     
 29 James D. Watson & Francis H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 
NATURE 737, 737 (1953) (emphasis added). 
 30 See Demosthenes B. Panagiotakos, The Value of p-Value in Biomedical Research, 
2008 OPEN CARDIOVASCULAR MED. J. 97, 98 (2008) (explaining the meaning of p-value 
and its prevalent usage in research). 
 31 See, e.g., Jimmy J. Zhuang, Stephen A. Banse & Craig P. Hunter, The Nuclear 
Argonaute NRDE-3 Contributes to Transitive RNAi in Caenorhabditis elegans, 194 
GENETICS 117, 122 fig. 2 (2013) (figure legend describes all the relevant data points with 
p-value less than 0.05 or 0.01). 
 32 Supra note 32, at 121 (“these results suggest that sago-1 and nrde-3 may define 
complementary silencing pathways”) (emphasis added). 
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nevertheless stand for a zealous scientific belief.  The conventional and 
trite counterargument is that scientists believe in some form of objective 
and progressive “truth” and therefore do not slant any wording.  However, 
throughout this Essay, I have instead argued that, merely out of tradition, 
scientists write in a more measured style than lawyers do.  Tentative, non-
zealous language is the linguistic tradition of science.  Second, lawyers 
and jurists focus extensively on language because it is the core of their 
workproduct; a poorly-written legal workproduct is a poor workproduct.  
By contrast, while scientists do strive for clarity, the core of their 
workproduct is not in its language.  Rather, language is merely a means to 
delineate scientific experiments, which is the actual scientific 
workproduct.33  In today’s digital age of high resolution media files, 
experiments can be depicted clearly in graphical or video form,34 which 
makes the language of a scientific paper an even lower priority.  Therefore, 
courts should not close-read something not intended for close-reading. 
IV. A RECONCILIATION 
Before endorsing the agency’s decision, the Benzene Court was 
seeking a reassuring degree of certainty for any scientific evidence that the 
agency relied upon.  During such searches for certainty, courts are likely 
to envision two different standards.  On one level, the courts perceive 
science as a progressive endeavor, where mistakes are common and their 
corrections are occasions for joy because scientific knowledge has 
advanced.  At this level, the requisite certainty is low.  On another level, 
the courts perceive legal determinations as a coercive endeavor, where 
mistakes are never tolerated because they carry grave costs.  At this level, 
the requisite certainty is much higher.  Using this two-tier certainty 
framework, it is not difficult to imagine why the Benzene Court reacted 
the way it did: findings with “likely” support are perfectly fine for science 
because they can always be corrected later, but “likely” findings are too 
tenuous to ground coercive legal powers on. 
In principle, I agree with this two-tier certainty framework.  Legal 
determinations should require higher certainty than scientific findings.  
However, the means by which the Benzene Court and subsequent courts 
                                                                                                                                     
 33 See generally Elisa M. Stone, Guiding Students to Develop an Understanding of 
Scientific Inquiry: A Science Skills Approach to Instruction and Assessment, 13 CBE LIFE 
SCI. ED. 90 (2014) (describing the importance of experimental skills as the core of science 
abilities). The great Michael Faraday is also often cited for the famous quip that an 
experiment not published is an experiment not done. This anecdote reflects the primary 
scientific importance of the experiment and ancillary role of language (of publication) in 
facilitating experiments. 
 34 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF VISUALIZED EXPERIMENTS, www.jove.com (last accessed Jan. 
7, 2016). 
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have chosen to evaluate certainty is grossly inappropriate.  Close-reading 
of scientific literature for words like “probable,” “perhaps,” “likely,” etc. 
is an imprecise and incorrect way to seek higher certainty because it 
overlooks science’s linguistic tradition.  Scientific writings use such 
halting qualifiers as terms-of-art, which are entirely divorced from actual 
measures of certainty.  Instead, more precise certainty indicators are in fact 
available in the scientific literature, in the form of p values and other 
statistical metrics.  Thus, future courts in search of scientific certainty 
should not rely on language selected and pasted from scientific literature, 
especially if opportunist lawyers seek to use such qualified linguistics to 
unfairly damage the evidence’s credibility.  Rather, courts should directly 
examine the underlying scientific findings’ statistical certainty.  
Obviously, a proposal requiring courts to undertake such an in-depth 
substantive review of scientific evidence needs to be assessed in terms of 
costs and benefits.  Regardless, courts should never rely, even partially, on 
the language of the scientific evidence within the administrative record 
because of the linguistic tradition discussed in this Essay. 
